HO-002CriticalProviderPreventive
Override and Intervention Capability
High-risk AI systems must include a capability for human overseers to intervene in or interrupt the system's operation, and providers must document this capability in the instructions for use with procedures for its activation.
Articles:Article 14(4)(e)Article 14(5)
Evidence Examples
- Override function specification
- Override activation procedure
- Override test results
Standards
ISO 42001:2023 §8.3
Related controls
- HO-001Human Oversight Mechanism DesignArticle 14(1) requires that high-risk AI systems are designed and developed in a way that enables natural persons to effectively oversee the system's…
- HO-003Stop Function ImplementationProviders must implement a stop function that enables the immediate cessation of the AI system's operation when required by human overseers, with a clear,…
- HO-004Automation Bias Awareness TrainingArticle 14(4) requires that oversight persons are aware of the tendency to over-rely on AI outputs (automation bias); deployers must implement training…
- HO-005Output Interpretation CapabilityDeployers must ensure that persons assigned to oversee high-risk AI systems have the capability to correctly interpret the system's outputs, including the…
- HO-006Decision Reversal and Correction ProcessDeployers must establish documented procedures for reversing or correcting AI-assisted decisions that affect natural persons, including how affected…
- HO-007Oversight Personnel Competency RequirementsProviders must specify in the instructions for use the competencies required for persons assigned to oversee the AI system, and deployers must verify that…
Related EU AI Act terms
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